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Book Reviews
Black Ops: The Rise of Special Forces in the C.I.A., the S.A.S., 
and Mossad. By Tony Geraghty. New York, NY: Pegasus Books, 
LLC, 2010. ISBN 978-1-60598-097-3. Photographs. Notes. 
Sources cited. Index. Pp. xi, 250. $28.95
With the backdrop of President Barack Obama's new strategy for 
Afghanistan, Tony Geraghty explores the development and utilization of 
Special Forces (SF) within the United States, British, and Israeli military. 
Special Forces units are highly trained, small military units designed to 
conduct secret missions with a relatively small number of personnel. 
These units typically have very close ties to their nation's intelligence 
services, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Special Air Service, 
or the Mossad: "The darkest, most sensitive Special Forces operations are 
linked to official, or quasi-official, intelligence agencies while remaining 
plausibly deniable," (p. 151). Geraghty looks at their post-World War II 
origins and their rise during the Cold War. He outlines how Special Forces 
have given governments flexibility in conducting guerrilla warfare and 
espionage activities, and have provided support to indigenous opposition 
forces. Their small footprint allows deniability that conventional military 
forces do not. Geraghty explains that "modern SF warfare has its origins 
in the Irish War of Independence, a war the British lost but from which 
they learned useful lesson" (p. xix). During the Cold War, SF units 
developed into the nation's elite counterterrorist fighting force and played 
critical roles in every major and minor conflict in the twentieth century. 
Geraghty effectively shows how the precision allowed by Special Forces is 
now being used as part of the U.S. military's strategy in Afghanistan. 
President Obama in a landmark speech on Afghanistan military strategy 
said that the military will have to be "nimble and precise" to be effective. 
Geraghty writes, "For 'nimble and precise' read 'Special Operations 
Forces'" (p. xlix).
Geraghty utilizes over 240 separate sources and includes three key 
reports as appendices, including General Stanley McChrystal's Report on 
Afghanistan, Afghanistan's Narcotics War, and a Senate report on the 
battle of Tora Bora. Throughout the book, Geraghty primarily examines 
the application of Special Forces in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but he 
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touches on several other conflicts, including British activity in Yemen and 
Oman, the failed rescue attempt of U.S hostages from Tehran dubbed 
Desert One, and Desert Storm. An example of this is a section dedicated to 
reviewing the Coalition Military actions in the battle of Tora Bora, 
Afghanistan. Geraghty describes the evidence of Usama bin Ladin's pres-
ence at this battle and the failure to commit enough resources to capture 
him, stating that "serious efforts to nail bin Laden before he escaped from 
entrapment in the rabbit warren of Tora Bora, near the Pakistan frontier, 
mean putting American lives on the line" (p. 119). Geraghty goes on to 
quote a United States Senate committee report, Tora Bora Revisited: 
"The injection of more U.S. troops and the resulting casualties would have 
contradicted the risk-adverse "light footprint' model formulated by 
Rumsfeld and Franks" (p. 119).
Geraghty makes one departure from a straight historical review of Special 
Forces by offering up opinions on how the 2003 United States-led inva-
sion of Iraq created a gap in Afghanistan filled by the reconstituted insur-
gency of the Taliban and al Qaida. "The first strategic error was to switch 
Special Operations resources from Afghanistan to Iraq," (p. 135). The 
author draws his conclusion based solely on one source, An Insider's 
Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan 
by Gary C. Schroen. While the information may prove to be true, the 
author does not provide the context on which the decisions were based 
and gives the perception the withdrawal was solely based on oil.
An explanation of the development of Israeli Special Forces under the 
Mossad, while interesting, does not enlighten the reader beyond current 
understanding. Geraghty does expound on the successful actions of the 
Israeli Special Forces and its critical place in the development of counter-
terrorist strategy. While the author masterfully crafts personal stories to 
explain the make-up of the various forces and their successful and failed 
missions, he jumps from service-to-service, conflict-to-conflict, decade-
to-decade, rapidly throughout the chapter, creating a disconnected feeling 
for the reader. This is balanced by the fact the author covers over sixty 
years of history for three different countries and their Special Forces 
units. While the book does not offer any solutions to the complex situa-
tions facing government in a post-9/11 world, and in light of the nature of 
Special Forces activities being shrouded in secrecy, the author does an 
excellent job at peering through the curtain to see the back story to events 
continuing to shape our world today.
Matthew D. Simmons, Special Agent, United States Air Force
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Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State? By 
C. Christine Fair, Keith Krane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Samir 
Puri, and Michale Spirtas. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2010. ISBN 978-0-8330-4807-3. Figures. Tables. 
Notes. Sources Cited. Pp. xxvii, 232. $35.00.
The RAND Corporation's latest analysis of U.S.-Pakistani relations is a 
combined effort that pulls together some of the foremost observers of the 
topic to address a problem that continues to evade a clearly defined solu-
tion. The authors have all traveled to, observed, written about, and 
offered solutions to Pakistan's security dilemmas. In this monograph, 
they offer a set of policy recommendations to guide a way forward for 
Washington and Islamabad. As with all RAND Corporation analyses, the 
research is meticulous, and the examination of the breadth and scope of 
the issue at hand is expansive. However, this tome serves more as a solid 
analysis of what has occurred rather than providing practical solutions of 
where to go from here. The authors offer solutions, but those ideas are 
more idealistic than practical or even pragmatic. In this sense, the book is 
squarely in "center mass" of existing literature with (on the positive side) 
great value to give the reader a sense of what has occurred, but (on the 
negative side) little value to point the reader to workable bilateral policy 
solutions.
In the first part of the book, the authors discuss the U.S.-Pakistan rela-
tionship in light of the post-September 11 alliance in the war on terror. 
Over the last few years, Washington has poured billions of dollars in assis-
tance into Islamabad for military, intelligence, and counterterrorism pro-
grams. In spite of this, Pakistan is more insecure, anti-U.S. sentiment has 
increased, aid to the Taliban has continued (albeit sporadically), and con-
crete results regarding Pakistani stability and progress in the war on ter-
ror have been difficult to measure: Islamabad still teeters on a precarious 
fulcrum in a perpetual balancing act between civilian and military rule. 
The authors outline the following factors: Pakistani support for the Tali-
ban continues in spite of threat of U.S. sanctions; Islamabad's nuclear 
surety is a perennial concern for Washington, which fears with some justi-
fication that fissile materials could fall into the wrong hands if civil order 
disintegrates; domestic instability remains a constant in spite of multiple, 
massive cash influxes from Washington, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations; and Washington and 
Islamabad have never seemed so far apart in terms of the mutually exclu-
sive nature of their over-arching strategic goals. It calls to mind the state-
ment of former President Bill Clinton, "insanity is doing the same thing 
over and over again and expecting a different result."
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In spite of repeated admonishments from Washington and the 
international community, Islamabad continues to foment within its own 
borders radical Islamic factions. It supports the Taliban (sometimes 
blatantly, sometimes covertly), provides aid to Kashmiri militants in a 
thinly-disguised proxy war against India, and inconsistently adheres to 
international human rights standards. In addition, the country suffers 
from inadequate health care—even by Third-World standards, high 
illiteracy, a dysfunctional education system that serves as a breeding 
ground for militancy and extremism, and chronic political cronyism that 
mocks any standard of public accountability.
As the authors examine how Pakistan might attempt to mitigate these 
myriad factors that contribute to the country's insecurity, they correctly 
observe some of the extant realities Islamabad must confront. Pakistan's 
irredentist territorial claims to Kashmir have fallen on deaf ears for 63 
years, both in New Delhi and in numerous international forums. The 
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the so-called "Durand Line," is 
more of a concept than a mutually accepted bilateral reality between 
Islamabad and Kabul. Islamabad, in spite of years of concrete evidence 
and multiple reports from international organizations, seemingly refuses 
to acknowledge the internal threat from myriad unchecked militant 
groups. This is perhaps due to the fact that its security arm, the Inter-
Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), uses these militants to further its 
own agenda against India (with Kashmiri proxies) and inside Afghanistan 
(with Taliban allies). Pakistan has little ability to combat militants and 
insurgents because the country has in fact aided and abetted those same 
entities through years of sponsorship, while corrupt police forces 
throughout the country undermine any credibility authorities might 
attempt to attain through a new focus on law and order.
Having outlined the scope of Pakistan's challenges, the authors offer a 
series of solutions which, while plausible and even workable in the West-
ern world, seem to ignore the teleological realities of Pakistan's history, 
culture, sociology, and society. The authors suggest that Islamabad for-
mulate and implement constitutional rule of law and re-engineer their 
justice system to further inculcate and institutionalize civilian rule of the 
military. While facile to offer in an academic model, this ignores the cul-
ture of political patronage that has run rampant since the country's incep-
tion. The authors do acknowledge that Pakistan's civilian leaders have 
habitually used the military and security organs to advance their own 
agendas. If past precedent holds true, this would continue to occur, so it is 
not clear why they think this "new" suggestion would offer a different 
result.
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The authors propose that Islamabad, presumably with aid from Washing-
ton and the international community, invest in their decayed and crum-
bling infrastructure, specifically in roads, electric power, education, and 
health care. There is no mechanism in place to do this, so it is not clear 
how the authors would have this implemented. The main weakness in the 
authors' recommendations is that there is little in the way of suggestion 
regarding how to bring these changes about. The authors do propose that 
Islamabad establish an entity akin to the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), but they seem to ignore the fact that such an entity would 
be subject to the control and whim of Pakistan's rulers, much as it serves 
the often blatant agendas of U.S. elected representatives who habitually 
use it to bring selectively to the fore issues they wish to highlight for polit-
ical gain. The authors do not tie U.S. financial assistance to concrete mea-
sures of social and political stability in Pakistan.
The U.S. and Pakistan have divergent goals towards Afghanistan and 
militant groups in South Asia. The U.S. has seen little return on its multi-
billion dollar aid packages, with some success against al-Qaida, but little 
aid against the Taliban, and Washington has been very inconsistent in 
terms of holding Islamabad accountable for the aid given in the last 
decade. This book, while useful in providing historical context and 
background regarding U.S.-Pakistan relations, is of limited utility for 
those outside the policy arena. There are better offerings to be had for 
those interested in intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection, 
and at a more affordable price.
Mark Roberts, Transportation Security Administration
et al.: Book Reviews
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The Making of a Spy: Memoir of a German Boy Soldier Turned 
American Army Intelligence Agent. By Gerhardt B. Thamm. 
Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2010. ISBN 978-0-
7864-4854-8. Ebook ISBN 978-0-7864-5564-5. 28 photos/
illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp. 231. $35.00.
The Making of a Spy provides a first person account of a remarkable 
period in history. The author served in the German Army for a few 
months as a fifteen-year-old "boy soldier." Thamm's account of his service 
gives an interesting glimpse into the final days of the Third Reich and 
some of the attitudes of the German people who lived where he made his 
home. After Thamm enlisted in the U.S. Army during the period between 
the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Korean War, he began a 
fascinating career in the intelligence world, which spanned several 
decades. Although he served until he retired from the U.S. Army, Thamm 
later had a civilian career with the Naval Intelligence Service and the 
Defense Intelligence Agency. The major portion of this current work is a 
recounting of his exploits as a Military Special Agent during the Cold War 
period when he served in a divided Berlin.
Thamm also had a specific account of his wartime service published by 
McFarland in 2000, with a paperback edition released in 2007. This work 
is titled Boy Soldier: A German Teenager at the Nazi Twilight. After over 
thirty-eight years in the field of intelligence and security-related opera-
tions, Thamm has written for the Armed Forces Journal International, 
Periscope, Golden Sphinx, and The Voice of Intelligence, and Naval Pro-
ceedings. In 1994, Thamm was honored by the Central Intelligence 
Agency for a report which was recently declassified and published in 
Naval Intelligence Professional Quarterly.
The author's writing style provides glimpses of his sense of humor as he 
details some of his journey through his professional life. Interestingly, 
although Thamm is a native-born American citizen, he was raised in Ger-
many from the age of approximately two years old. His parents came to 
America before the Great Depression and his father developed a deep 
affection for America and all it represents. The father worked for Ford 
Motor Company until he lost his job in the economic chaos of the great 
Depression. Gerhardt had been born in the United States, but without 
close family to provide assistance, he and his parents had to return to Ger-
many. The Thamms relocated to the farming estate of Gerhardt's grandfa-
ther in Janer, Lower Silesia, in Eastern Germany. The Poles and Russians 
confiscated the grandfather's farm at the end of World War II and the 
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Thamm family was placed in a condition of forced servitude by the vic-
tors. This experience helped to shape young Gerhardt's view of Commu-
nists and influenced his attitude toward his work in later life.
When the author relates his return to the United States and his subse-
quent enlistment in the U.S. Army, it is difficult to fully appreciate the 
hurdles he faced with a limited command of the English language at that 
time. His former military experience in combat and his obvious command 
of the German language were definite assets however, and Thamm 
describes how a perceptive personnel colonel recognized his value. The 
assignment in which he dealt with a massive number of captured Nazi 
documents, containing high value intelligence reports on our former Rus-
sian allies, gives today's reader a better understanding of the importance 
of organization and methodology in approaching the analytical aspect of 
intelligence work.
When Thamm was later selected for training as a field agent, he was 
involved in the interrogation of defectors to the West. He also met 
another interrogator, a star by all accounts, whom he would encounter in 
a strange way much later in life. His description of his early agent training 
for the clandestine field work of a spy will seem familiar to many who 
have had much more recent courses in the same type of work. Apparently, 
the old statement about some things never changing has more than a 
grain of truth.
Thamm does an amazing job of painting his sometimes dangerous, but 
never dull work as a field agent in Cold War Berlin. Of course, he never 
touches on any classified information; however, the moving way in which 
he details some of his field work and the effect of his often dangerous 
activities on his family highlights the sacrifices made by all who are 
closely associated with this profession. One of the most interesting memo-
ries Thamm offers is the story of the attempt to kidnap and "sell" him to 
authorities in East Berlin. Many people in today's world may not realize 
just how dangerous and uncertain the Cold War was for the actual partici-
pants in the world of spies.
In his recollections of his early training, Thamm mentions the great 
emphasis placed on targeting potential sources by determining how badly 
the targets needed money. He goes on to explain that he believes money 
to be the greatest motivator in persuading individuals to work against the 
national interest of their native country. Unfortunately, this has proven to 
be true far too often in the clandestine activities of traitors to the United 
States. Obviously, the environment of post-WWII Europe, and specifically 
in divided Germany, provided a fertile ground for recruiting sources that 
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had almost nothing left to provide for themselves and their families. How-
ever, as Thamm would learn later in his career, not all traitors need 
money for survival. Some, like those identified in United States history, 
simply are so greedy that any betrayal becomes acceptable.
This book paints a great historical picture of several important areas. 
Thamm does an excellent job of describing his military service during the 
end of World War II as well as in the U.S. Army as our nation began to 
adjust to the post-war demands of a different kind of warfare. His descrip-
tions of his early training are vivid and interesting. In describing the 
stress on his family, particularly his first wife, Thamm could be describing 
a problem from this week instead of from years ago. Any individual who 
follows the Intelligence/Counterintelligence profession will identify 
closely with the description of the costs to personal relationships. No one 
who reads this book will fail to come away with a better understanding of 
the Cold War operations in Berlin unless, like the author, that reader 
actually lived the story. In summary, this book describes the early period 
in the life of a successful spy and leaves the reader curious to know more 
details about this remarkable man.
Millard E. Moon, EdD., Colonel (ret), U.S. Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations
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The Watchers: The Rise of America's Surveillance State. By 
Shane Harris. New York: The Penguin Press, 2010. ISBN 978-1-
59420-245-2. Pp. 418. Index. Notes. $27.95.
The Watchers is a history of the Total Information Awareness (TIA) pro-
gram. This was an ambitious research and development project envi-
sioned by Admiral John Poindexter, who is at the center of most of this 
book. TIA as originally envisioned was an attempt to use network analysis 
and visual mapping technologies to display results from data mining exer-
cises on giant data sets containing information on terrorists. When this 
technology secretly was moved to the National Security Agency (NSA), it 
was called the "BAG," an abbreviation for "Big Assed Graph." The types of 
databases mined included intercepts of emails, telephone call records, 
flight reservations, financial transfers and credit card reporting, video 
surveillance, and generally everything that could be captured by informa-
tion systems, no matter where and no matter whom it concerned.
The groundwork for the approach had been created in the Army's Infor-
mation Dominance Center (IDC), a futuristic installation designed by 
Brian Ferren, a Disney engineer. Under John Hamre, the work at IDC led 
to the identification of a vast Chinese industrial espionage network oper-
ating within the United States. As it turned out, this project, code named 
"Abel Danger," also had identified Mohammed Atta, one of the 9/11 
hijackers, and had been handing this information over to the Army's Spe-
cial Operations Command, which was engaged in al-Qaida hunting.
The problem with all of this work was that in order to capture information 
regarding terrorists operating on U.S. soil, it was necessary to analyze 
information from databases containing records of U.S. citizens. As a 
result, after ninety days, Erik Kleinsmith, who was managing Able 
Danger, was forced to erase all of the terabytes of data containing 
information on terrorists and Chinese espionage agents. This was before 
9/11. After 9/11 when the Senate found about this, the enraged Senators 
held hearings. This was one of the early indications that U.S. privacy laws 
as then written were incompatible with anti-terrorist intelligence 
operations and analysis.
Poindexter's vision was to have a "privacy machine" built into TIA. This 
system would code the personal name of each U.S. citizen with an 
encrypted number. The database mining would work the same way, but 
information regarding the identities of any U.S. citizen would be 
"unlocked" only if there was reasonable cause for doing so, probably 
through an order from a magistrate. One of the great ironies in this story 
is that when TIA secretly was moved to NSA, the privacy protections were 
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dropped. This eventually led to the showdown between Director of 
National Intelligence Mike McConnell and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, 
as they made modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) laws. Eventually, the courts ruled that it is permissible for the gov-
ernment, meaning NSA, to capture vast amounts of data on U.S. citizens 
and analyze it if there is reasonable cause to believe it is connected to 
identification of terrorists. This ruling means that no electronic informa-
tion from any U.S. citizen or anyone else is protected from electronic sur-
veillance. As the books makes clear, contracts between information 
services and telecommunications providers with the U.S. Government 
guarantee that all information is fed directly into the dark shadows of the 
intelligence world.
The Watchers chronicles the ups and downs of the story and provides 
many details regarding the principal players: John Poindexter, Erik 
Kleinsmith, Michael Hayden, Keith Alexander, Mary McCarthy, Michael 
Wertheimer, Mike McConnell, and an eccentric genius named Jeff Jonas, 
whose software that had helped casinos in Las Vegas determine if poten-
tial employees had any connection to criminals or felons was adapted to 
TIA. Jonas eventually concluded that the overall approach would not 
work without endangering the privacy of all U.S. citizens, but he did not 
say that it would not work.
The author has based most of the writing on detailed interviews with the 
main persons concerned, combining it with extensive analysis of 
speeches, books, and it seems every other source available. The footnotes 
at the end show the details of this research and are worth reading in 
themselves.
One of the interesting literary touches to The Watchers is its starting 
point: Admiral Poindexter many years ago on his first patrol in the North 
Atlantic listening for sonar signals of Russian submarines. As the book 
continues, this sub-hunting exercise becomes an allegory for the sifting 
through tens of thousands of terabytes of an ocean of data to locate a spe-
cific terrorist.
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In addition to the details regarding the TIA, this book is a good example of 
what remarkable men can mean to society. To see what Admiral Poindex-
ter did is to see what a Cal Tech physics graduate and someone at the top 
of his or her class at the Naval Academy can accomplish. Not only is there 
a sweeping and comprehensive vision and architecture for a revolutionary 
program, but also the personal leadership qualities and charisma that 
enables one to get things done. In that sense, The Watchers is a story of 
genuine and unflinching leadership.
Edward M. Roche, Ph.D., J.D., Professor of Intelligence Technologies, 
Henley-Putnam University
et al.: Book Reviews
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